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12.1 Introduction
The 2003 annual report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance
(released by the Japanese Cabinet Oﬃce) stated “the sustainability of the
present ﬁscal and social security systems is uncertain and hence, an early
commitment toward bold institutional reforms is required” (p. 1). The an-
nual report listed for the ﬁrst time social security reforms with regard to the
aging population, and presented these reforms not in the form of a prob-
lem to be dealt with in the future but as an issue of urgent importance.
In the public pension reforms of 2004, Japan cut future pension beneﬁts
substantially. Since the ratio of the aggregate pension beneﬁts to the na-
tional income (NI) is designed to be stable in the future, the ﬁnancial prob-
lems associated with public pension have been resolved to some extent.
Failure to reduce intergenerational inequality is a persistent problem in the
public pension program; this is because the primary aim of the reforms was
to reduce the pension beneﬁts and contributions of future generations.
The expenditure incurred on health insurance and long-term care insur-
ance is also expected to increase. It is not easy, however, to reduce these
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Scientiﬁc Research from the Ministry of Education.beneﬁts as pension beneﬁts because health care and long-term care ser-
vices are essential for human welfare. Bradford and Max (1997) and Cut-
ler and Sheiner (2000) have shown that an unfunded health insurance cre-
ates considerable intergenerational income redistribution. If these health
insurance costs are ﬁnanced using the current scheme (essentially, a pay-
as-you-go system), a large increase in the future burden of these costs will
become inevitable, thus creating an intergenerational imbalance of bur-
den. One way to restoring intergenerational equity is for social insurance
programs to prefund the expected increase in future costs. In this chapter,
we consider the eﬀects of introducing a prefunding scheme on the inter-
generational distribution of burdens. Based on the following three points,
this chapter gives new insights into the future ﬁnancial problems of social
insurance programs.
First, this chapter examines both health care and long-term care pro-
grams. Feldstein (1999) proposed prefunding of the Medicare program,
and Suzuki (2000) conducted a simulation study of the prefunding of the
Japanese health insurance program. This chapter also explores the concept
of prefunding long-term care insurance. Annual spending on long-term
care services is smaller than the expenditure incurred on health care ser-
vices; however, long-term care costs are concentrated heavily on the aged
population. Therefore, prefunding the cost associated with long-term care
requires a large amount of saving. It is necessary to take into account both
health and long-term care insurance in order to be able to comprehend the
ﬁnancial problems faced by social insurance programs in the future.
Our analysis of the intergenerational inequity of burdens is along the
lines of the generational accounting pioneered by Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoﬀ (1991). Since we have focused on the ways in which health and
long-term care costs may be ﬁnanced, the analytical framework adopted 
is somewhat diﬀerent from that used in the generational accounting ap-
proach. We specify future policy variables and calculate the cost burdens
with regard to the speciﬁed policy scenario. Our focus is conﬁned only to
health and long-term care insurances, while the generational accounting
model considers a wider range of governmental programs. We have instead
provided a detailed discussion of these programs.
Second, our simulation has a long time horizon until the ﬁscal year (FY)
2100, while the government has projected social security costs for health
care and long-term care until FY 2025. Government projections with re-
gard to social security costs were only until FY 2025 since the aging pro-
cess was expected to reach its peak at this point with most baby boomers
approaching the end of their lifetime. Due to a decline in fertility rates af-
ter the late 1970s, aging is now expected to continue beyond FY 2025; a
much longer time horizon is required in order to examine the eﬀects of a
demographic change on social security costs.
416 Tadashi Fukui and Yasushi IwamotoThird, the validity of future projections is examined. The main alterna-
tive scenario here assumes that, with the exception of population structure,
all the present factors will be sustained in the future. This projection pro-
cedure is applied mechanically to the labor force, health care expenditure,
and long-term care costs instead of constructing a sophisticated forecast-
ing model. A virtue of the mechanical projection model is that relation-
ships between the variables under consideration can be easily established.
Comparing the projected values with the government’s forecasts can clar-
ify the manner in which projections are inﬂuenced by the government as-
sumptions.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 12.2 describes the
current problems in the budget of the Japanese social security programs.
We point out that the growth of health and long-term care costs is the most
serious problem for the sustainability of the government budget.
Section 12.3 focuses on the projections of labor force participation. The
government projection is optimistic because it assumes that a greater num-
ber of women and the elderly will participate in the labor market. We pro-
vide an alternative projection in which increasing labor force participa-
tion is not expected. Although the estimated labor force depends on the
assumptions of labor supply behavior, the trend decline in the total labor
force will be signiﬁcant in any scenario.
Section 12.4 focuses on health care expenditure and long-term care ser-
vice costs. We project these costs until FY 2100 with regard to three sce-
narios. Even under the most optimistic scenario that assumes stagnation in
the growth of per capita cost, the previously mentioned costs to income
will steadily increase until the 2060s.
Section 12.5 explains some policy simulations that deal with the ﬁnanc-
ing of future health and long-term care costs until FY 2100. It is shown
that the balanced budget operation of health and long-term care insur-
ances will create a large inequity of burden across generations. Raising 
the premium immediately and prefunding rising future costs will help to
equate the burden across generations. However, with regard to our baseline
scenario, the total burden must be raised immediately by approximately 60
percent.
We present some concluding remarks in section 12.6.
12.2 Long-Term Projection of Social Security Beneﬁts
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) occasionally
publishes “Perspectives on the Beneﬁts and Burdens of the Social Secu-
rity System” (Shakai-hoshou no Kyufu to Futan no Mitooshi), which proj-
ects the beneﬁts and burdens associated with public pension, health care,
and social work, including long-term care. According to the projections
Policy Options for Financing Future Health and Long-Term Care Costs 417made in May 2004 (we refer to it as MHLW 2004 projection hereafter),
total social security beneﬁts are expected to increase from 23.5 percent of
the total NI at factor cost to 29 percent between FY 2004 and FY 2025
(see table 12.1).1
However, future trends in these beneﬁts vary with social security pro-
grams. Public pension beneﬁts will not increase and will actually become
slightly lower in FY 2025 as compared to their current levels. This stabi-
lization of future pension beneﬁts was achieved by the pension reform of
2004. Prior to this reform, the contribution rate for private employees to-
ward the pension program was planned to increase gradually from 13.58
percent of total earnings to 23.1 percent of the same in FY 2020. Since this
ﬁgure appeared to be unacceptable, controlling the contribution rate be-
came the primary focus of this reform. The ﬁnal contribution rate was re-
duced to 18.3 percent of total earnings, and a signiﬁcant reduction in ben-
eﬁts for the future was implemented. However, this reform does not resolve
all of the major problems. As explained by Maekawa (2004), since beneﬁts
are gradually reduced, the reform fails to correct the inequity in net bene-
ﬁts among generations. An immediate reduction in beneﬁts accompanied
by an increase in the contribution rate is necessary to reduce the intergen-
erational inequity.
An emerging component of social costs is the beneﬁts of health insur-
ance and long-term care insurance. Health care beneﬁt as a fraction of NI
will increase by 4.1 percentage points until FY 2025, whereas the long-
term care beneﬁt will grow by 2.2 percentage points during the same pe-
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Table 12.1 Projection of Social Security beneﬁts and burdens (% of NI at
factor cost)
Fiscal year
2004 2010 2015 2025
Social Security beneﬁts 23.5 25.4 27.0 29.0
Public pension 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.2
Health care 7.1 8.2 9.2 11.2
Welfare, etc. 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.7
Long-term care 1.4 2.2 2.7 3.6
Social Security burdens 21.3 24.2 26.6 29.5
Social insurance premium 14.2 15.5 16.7 18.3
Government subsidies 7.1 8.7 9.6 11.2
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2004).
1. The ratio of total security beneﬁts to IN at factor cost indicates an unnecessary ﬂuctua-
tion when the VAT tax rate changes. The Japanese government had begun to use the ratio of
total security beneﬁts to IN at factor cost long before the introduction of VAT. In this chap-
ter, however, we shall focus on the ratio of these beneﬁts to GDP instead.riod. The big question that needs to be answered by the policymakers is:
how to ﬁnance these costs?
If health and long-term care insurances are operated by the pay-as-you-
go system, the cost burden on workers will steadily increase, thus creating
an intergenerational imbalance of burdens. Prefunding future social secu-
rity costs will help to reduce this imbalance by forcing the present genera-
tions to pay more, thereby reducing the extra burden on future generations.
The ﬁnancial condition of a prefunding system relies on future economic
variables such as the interest rate, wage growth rate, and technological
change in medicine. Since the reliability of a future projection is a crucial
factor in determining the success of prefunding schemes, we shall examine
how a prefunding system is aﬀected by the future conditions of the Japa-
nese economy.
12.3 Economic Growth and the Labor Force
In this section and the succeeding one, we shall discuss the properties of
governmental projections and provide our alternative projections on the
labor force, economic growth, health care costs, and long-term care costs.
This section focuses on variables that determine income.
The publication “Perspectives on the Beneﬁts and Burdens of Social Se-
curity” does not rely on a general equilibrium model of the economy. It as-
sumes the growth rate of real national income to be the sum of the growth
rates of wage and labor force. This framework can be justiﬁed in the fol-
lowing situation. A production function is homogeneous of degree one
with capital K and labor L. This function witnesses a labor-augmenting
technological progress. It is represented as
(1) Y   F(K, AL).
Here, Y and A represent the output and eﬃciency, respectively. Diﬀerenti-
ating equation (1) with respect to time yields
(2)            .
When the growth rates of capital and eﬃciency unit of labor are the
same, the ﬁrst term in the RHS of equation (2) becomes zero. The eco-
nomic growth rate then equals the sum of the growth rate of labor-
augmenting technological change (the wage growth rate) and the growth
rate of labor input.
The MHLW 2004 projection assumes the growth rate of labor input to
be 0.1 percent until FY 2008, –0.2 percent in FY 2009 and FY 2010, and
–0.5 percent from FY 2011 onward. The labor force in FY 2025 will be
61.58 million, which is 7.24 percent smaller than its level in 2004. This
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tooshi), which was compiled by the Employment Security Bureau of MHLW
in May 2002 (we shall refer to it as the MHLW 2002 labor force projec-
tion). The lower section of table 12.2 indicates that the MHLW 2002 labor
force projection forecasts an increase ni the labor force participation rates
of the elderly and women. The upper section of table 12.2 however, indi-
cates the labor force calculated by multiplying the labor force participa-
tion rates as reported by the Employment Security Bureau and the oﬃcial
population projections (medium variant) for each age group. The calcu-
lated labor force in 2025 is 62.97 million, which is slightly greater than
those estimated by the MHLW 2004 projection. The initial point of the
MHLW 2002 labor force projection was 2000, when the total labor force
was 67.66 million. Due to the decline in the labor force to 66.42 million in
2004, the MHLW 2004 projection starts with a smaller initial point and
adopts a similar growth rate, thus estimating a smaller labor force in the fu-
ture.
While the government projection assumes an increase in the labor force
participation, we are apprehensive of this increase not being realized. To
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Table 12.2 The projection of the labor force by MHLW, by gender and year
Male Female
2000 2025 2000 2025
Labor force (thousands) 40,140 36,310 27,520 26,655
Labor force participation 
rates by age group (%)
15–19 18.4 20.1 16.6 17.8
20–24 72.7 77.6 72.7 73.7
25–29 95.8 95.9 69.9 75.3
30–34 97.7 97.6 57.1 65.0
35–39 97.8 97.8 61.4 67.4
40–44 97.7 97.8 69.3 75.2
45–49 97.3 97.5 71.8 77.0
50–54 96.7 96.9 68.2 73.5
55–59 94.2 94.4 58.7 67.5
60–64 72.6 85.0 39.5 60.5
65– 34.1 29.5 14.4 13.0
Source: The 2025 labor force: the Perspective on the Labor Force Participation Rate (July
2002, the Employment Security Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) and the 2000
labor force and labor force participation rate: the Labor Force Survey (Statistics Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication).
Note: The 2025 labor force is calculated by multiplying the projected population (medium
variant) reported in the Population Projections for Japan: 2001–50 (January 2002, National
Institute of Population and Social Security Research) by the labor force participation rates by
age groups.examine the impact of projecting a future labor supply optimistically, we
considered an alternative scenario.2 We used the labor force participation
rates by age from the 2000 Population Census and the future population es-
timates from “The Population Projections for Japan: 2001–2050” (January
2001, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research). The
Population Census records the labor force participation rates of individu-
als up to 84 years of age (individuals aged 85 years and above are catego-
rized as one age group). We rescaled the labor force participation rates of
each group in such a manner that our estimates of the total labor force in
2000 were in concordance with the values reported in 2004 by the Labor
Force Survey.3
Table 12.3 shows our mechanical projection. From 2004 to 2025, the la-
bor force will decrease by 8 million to a level of 58.39 million people. A de-
crease in the labor force will continue after 2025 and every decade will wit-
ness a labor force loss of more than ﬁve million people. In 2050, a total
labor force of 44.69 million people will be available. The rate of change in
the total labor force with regard to its value in 2004 is 32.7 percent. When
a population projection is based on a low variant, the projected number be-
comes more pessimistic. In 2050, the rate of change in the total labor force
with regard to its value in 2004 is 38 percent. Since the eﬀects of a low birth
rate appear only after newborn generations begin to work, the labor force
in 2025 does not show considerable variations.
The MHLW 2004 projection regarded the labor force as a labor input.
Since the eﬃciency of labor varies with age, the overall values of labor force
and labor input may ﬂuctuate diﬀerently. However, the procedure followed
in the MHLW 2004 projection can be reﬁned. We estimated an eﬃciency
unit of labor implied by the two MHLW projections, assuming that eﬃ-
ciency is directly proportional to wage. The age-wage proﬁle by age group
and sex was collected from the published cross-tables of the 2003 Basic Sur-
vey on Wage Structure (Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa,MHLW). For each age
the eﬃciency unit of labor input is calculated as the product of the total
wage per worker and the projected labor force. We rescaled the aggregated
eﬃciency unit of labor in 2004 so that it equaled the total labor force in that
year. We considered three scenarios: our mechanical projection (pessimistic),
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2. Iwamoto (1998) analyzed existing studies on labor force and also projected the labor
force until 2020. His mechanical projection assumes that the present labor force participation
rates by age groups will be sustained in the future and that the structure of future populations
will change. His estimates are not very diﬀerent from preceding estimates made in academic
studies that also incorporated behavioral changes. This can be attributed to the fact that there
is no scope for drastic changes in the labor force participation rates of working-age popula-
tions. In addition, although the trend regarding birth rates in the future is uncertain, future
population can be predicted with considerable surety.
3. The Population Census recorded the labor force in 2000 to be 66.1 million. According to





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the MHLW 2004 projection (optimistic), and the MHLW 2002 projection
(more optimistic).
Figure 12.1depicts the three scenarios regarding labor input. According
to our previously discussed normalization, the MHLW 2002 labor force
projection estimated the labor input in 2025 to be 63.02 million. The 2004
counterpart of our mechanical projection is estimated to be 59.03 million.
The MHLW 2004 projection underlying the social security cost projection
lies between these two values. While the diﬀerence between these projec-
tions is signiﬁcant, all of them project a further decline in the value of la-
bor input after 2025. In 2100, the value of labor input is estimated to be
30.08 million in the most optimistic case as against 28.08 million in the
most pessimistic one. The bottom line is that even in the most optimistic
scenario, the large decline in the availability of labor force will be unavoid-
able.
12.4 Long-Term Projections of Health and Long-Term Care Beneﬁts
The MHLW projection assumes that the costs incurred by health care
and long-term care will grow more rapidly as compared to income. If our
mechanical projection procedure is applied to both these costs, the esti-
mates will be smaller than those estimated by oﬃcial projections. To clar-
ify the meaning of the oﬃcial projections, this section describes a sensitiv-
ity analysis employing alternative settings for the key variables. Combining
the two scenarios of health and long-term care costs with the three projec-
tion scenarios of labor forces, we apply six cases of projections. The fol-
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Fig. 12.1 Comparison of three labor input projectionslowing two subsections describe a procedure used for projecting the two
costs. We then present the results obtained for the sensitivity analysis.
12.4.1 Health Care Cost
Table 12.4 compares ﬁve recent projections about health care and long-
term care costs. Since projections in diﬀerent years assume diﬀerent inﬂa-
tion rates, comparing nominal variables is misleading. When we look at the
ratios of social security beneﬁts to NI, projected health expenditures diﬀer
mildly. The real growth of health care costs appears to be more stable than
the nominal growth of the same.
Future health expenditures are projected by extrapolating the most re-
cent actual values of nominal health expenditure; these do not correspond
with the values of inﬂation rate and economic growth rate. For example,
the May 2004 projection assumes that the per capita nominal health care
cost for the nonelderly (individuals under the age of 69) will grow at 2.1
percent and that for the elderly aged 70 and above will grow at 3.2 percent.
These growth rates are based on the historical averages recorded during
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Table 12.4 Perspectives on health care and long-term care costs reported by the Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare (in trillions of yen)
Projected date
November 1996
March September October May May 
Fiscal year 1994 (A) (B) 1997 2000 2002 2004
Health care costs
1993 24
1995 24 24 24
2000 38 26
2010 68 35 34
2025 141 107–108 96 90 71 60 59






2025 13–20 14–21 21 20 19
(2) (2.5) (3) (3.5) (3.5)
Sources: Welfare Vision for the 21st Century (May 1994, Ministry of Health and Welfare) and various
issues of Perspectives on the Beneﬁts and Burdens of the Social Security System (Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare).
Notes: Numbers represent beneﬁts of each type of social insurance. The numbers in parentheses repre-
sent the ratio of social insurance beneﬁts to NI at factor cost. The projection in November 1996 con-
tained two scenarios. Case (A) assumed that the long-term care insurance would not be introduced. Case
(B) assumed that it would be introduced in FY2000.1995 and 1999.4 The extrapolation of nominal health expenditure without
taking into account the eﬀects of inﬂation can be problematic from the
viewpoint of economic theory. Economists generally make projections
based on real values, and the methodologies adopted by them belong to a
family of mechanical projections. Iwamoto (2004) analyzed several projec-
tions made in existing studies such as Ogura and Irifune (1990); Ogura
(1994); Niki (1995); Iwamoto, Takeshita, and Bessho (1997); Nishimura
(1997); and Tokita et al. (1997). He concluded that in the following 30
years, the national health expenditure would increase by about 1.4 times
compared to its level in 2000. Our mechanical projection follows a method
established by existing studies and assumes that per capita health expendi-
ture by age group reported in the National Medical Expenditure (MHLW,
shown in table 12.5) will be sustained in the future. For the future popula-
tion data, we use the medium variant of the oﬃcial projection.
Although the previous projection assumes no real growth of health care
cost, it can be easily extended to cases in which the health care cost grows.
When the economy grows, we focus on the ratio of health care cost to in-
come. When the health care cost and income grow at the same rate, the ratio
will not change. In such a scenario, our mechanical projection estimates can
be considered as this ratio. In the alternative framework described in the next
section, we will concern ourselves only with the diﬀerence in growth rates be-
tween costs and income and not with the absolute levels of each growth rate.
Since we intend to frame our mechanical projection in such a way that it
is comparable with the MHLW 2004 projection, the data with regard to age
group were converted so that they were in concordance with the income
level of FY 2004. First, per capita health care cost by age group was pro-
portionally adjusted so that the national aggregate of the same matches the
ﬁgures reported in the Medical Information Analysis System (MEDIAS),
which reports the health care costs paid by public health insurance. The
national aggregate of health care costs was calculated as the product of
population and per capita cost by age group. The rescaled age-cost proﬁle
was used to project future health care costs.
Further, we decomposed the total cost toward social insurance payment
and out-of-pocket expenses. Unfortunately, MEDIAS does not provide
this decomposition. We obtained the ﬁgures for social security payment
from the National Medical Expenditure survey (Kokumin Iryohi).5 While
Policy Options for Financing Future Health and Long-Term Care Costs 425
4. The MHLW provides an estimation of the growth rate in medical expenditure after ad-
justing for the eﬀects of population aging since 1980. Overall, the per capita medical expen-
diture had grown less than per capita GDP; however, this correspondence was reversed dur-
ing the 1990s.
5. The National Medical Expenditure (NME) lags one year behind MEDIAS in the release of
data. We ﬁrst estimated the 2004 NME data by multiplying the growth rate of a comparable ME-
DIAS variable between 2003 and 2004 with the 2003 NME data. Since out-of-pocket expenses
for NME also include payments of medical treatments that are not covered by the social secu-
rity programs, we estimated the out-of-pocket payments as a residual of the overall payments.allocating social insurance payment across generations, we used the statu-
tory coinsurance rates of 2004 and assumed that they will be sustained in
the future. Since April 2003, the coinsurance rate for the age group 0 to 2
years has been 20 percent, whereas for the age group 3 to 69, it has been 30
percent. For individuals aged 70 years and above, the rate in principle has
been 10 percent (a rate of 20 percent is applied to high-income earners).
Due to the lack of available data, we assume that a rate of 10 percent is
applied to all individuals aged 70 and above. However, the actual out-of-
pocket payments are less than the statutory coinsurance rate because of
stop-loss rules and other schemes to reduce out-of-pocket expenses. We
proportionally scaled the statutory coinsurance rates so that the sum of the
estimated social insurance payments matched the aggregate values re-
ported by MEDIAS in 2004.
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Table 12.5 Expenditures on health care and long-term care per capita, by age group
(2004 ﬁscal year; in yen)





















Notes: The values are the sum of beneﬁts from insurers and copayments by patients. Health
care expenditure is calculated by proportionally adjusting the FY 2002 value reported in the
National Medical Expenditure (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) so that the national
aggregate matches the health care expenditure reported by MEDIAS; this system totals the
costs of services covered by public health insurance. The National Medical Expenditure cat-
egorizes individuals who are 75 years of age and above as one age group. Long-term care ex-
penditure: the values are calculated by multiplying the actual costs of services covered by
long-term care insurance in October 2004 as reported in the Monthly Report of Long-Term
Care Beneﬁts (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) by 12. Individuals who are 40 years of
age and above can be the recipients of long-term care insurance. The report categorizes indi-
viduals between 40 and 60 years of age as one age group.Since the available data on health expenditure does not separately report
the expenditure incurred for the age groups 0 to 2 and 3 to 4, we assumed
that the health expenditure per capita will be uniform in these age groups;
we then calculated the average coinsurance rate. Since actual costs are con-
centrated on newborn babies, this procedure may slightly overestimate the
true social security payment value. However, at the same time, many mu-
nicipal governments oﬀer extra beneﬁts toward the health expenditure of
infants from their general budget. Since we do not incorporate these sub-
sidies into our estimation process, it results in an underestimation of the
social security beneﬁts granted to these age groups. However, the overall
impact of these subsidies on our estimation bias is ambiguous.
We then reproduced the MHLW 2004 projection of the future health in-
surance beneﬁts. The MHLW 2004 projection assumes that the nominal
wage growth rate is 2.1 percent per annum. Therefore, per capita health
care costs for the nonelderly will grow simultaneously with the growth rate
of wage. As against this, the growth rate of per capita costs for the elderly
will exceed that for wage by 1.1 percentage points. The projection with re-
gard to the nonelderly is the same as our mechanical projection. For costs
beyond 2025, we need to ﬁrst specify the growth rate of wage for the same.
If the growth rate of health care costs continuously exceeds that of wage, it
will ultimately exhaust all the resources available to consumers. We thus
need to assume that the growth in health care costs will cease sometime in
the future. Hence, we consider two cases in which a faster growth in health
care costs will eventually stop in FY 2025 or FY 2100. In the former case,
the per capita health care cost for the elderly is 5.56 times greater than that
for the nonelderly. The counterpart in FY 2004 is 4.3. In the latter case, an
extreme increase occurs in the growth of health care cost for the elderly; the
ratio in FY 2100 will be 13.09.
As a measure of ﬁnancial burden, we focus on the ratio of social security
beneﬁts to the compensation of employees and the mixed income in terms
of national accounts. The denominator of the ratio is assumed to be pro-
portional to the amount of labor input. Changes in future health care costs
can be described by the following three scenarios: the per capita health
care cost for the elderly will (a) grow at the same rate as that of wage growth
(optimistic), (b) will exceed the wage growth rate by 1.1 percentage points
until FY 2025 (pessimistic), or (c) will exceed the wage growth rate by 1.1
percentage points until FY 2100 (very pessimistic). Combining these three
scenarios with future changes in labor input yields nine diﬀerent cases of
future projection. The upper section of table 12.6 presents these ratios.
The MHLW 2004 projection indicates that the ratio of health expendi-
ture to labor input in FY 2025 will exceed its value in FY 2004 by 1.58. This
scenario was reproduced in our social cost pessimistic and labor force op-
timistic scenarios; this indicates that the ratio will grow by a factor of 1.56
between FY 2004 and FY 2025. On the other hand, the same ratio under
Policy Options for Financing Future Health and Long-Term Care Costs 427the mechanical projection will grow by a factor of 1.38 during the same
period. Therefore, the MHLW 2004 projection is more pessimistic with
regard to a future increase in health expenditure as compared to our me-
chanical projection. However, the most pessimistic scenario is a combina-
tion of an extremely pessimistic projection of health care costs coupled
with a mechanical projection of the labor force in the future. In this case,
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Table 12.6 Projection of the ratio of health and long-term care costs to labor input, by year




Very optimistic 1.08 1.16 1.29 1.35 1.47 1.62 1.55
Optimistic 1.09 1.18 1.32 1.38 1.51 1.66 1.59
Pessimistica 1.12 1.22 1.38 1.44 1.59 1.74 1.66
Social cost: Pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 1.12 1.26 1.52 1.59 1.75 1.93 1.84
Optimisticb 1.13 1.28 1.56 1.62 1.79 1.98 1.89
Pessimistic 1.16 1.32 1.63 1.70 1.88 2.07 1.98
Social cost: Very pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 1.12 1.26 1.52 1.65 1.99 2.41 3.66
Optimistic 1.13 1.28 1.56 1.69 2.04 2.47 3.75




Very optimistic 1.25 1.52 2.03 2.31 2.81 3.14 3.31
Optimistic 1.26 1.54 2.08 2.36 2.88 3.21 3.39
Pessimistica 1.29 1.59 2.17 2.47 3.02 3.37 3.55
Social cost: Pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 1.34 1.73 2.61 2.97 3.61 4.03 4.25
Optimisticb 1.35 1.76 2.67 3.03 3.70 4.13 4.35
Pessimistic 1.39 1.81 2.79 3.18 3.88 4.33 4.56
Social cost: Very pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 1.34 1.73 2.61 3.15 4.32 5.43 10.41
Optimistic 1.35 1.76 2.67 3.22 4.42 5.56 10.65
Pessimistic 1.39 1.81 2.79 3.37 4.64 5.83 11.15
Source: Author’s calculation.
Note:Numbers represent the ratio of health care costs and long-term care costs to labor input (FY 2004
= 1).
aMechanical projection. The future labor force participation rate and per capita social cost by age group
will be constant.
bA projection that replicates the MHLW 2004 projection, which is reported in table 12.1.the ratio of health expenditure to labor input in FY 2025 will exceed its
value in FY 2004 by 1.63.
A noticeable point is that this ratio will keep increasing, and its value in
2050 under the setting employed by the government projection will be 1.98
times greater than its value in FY 2004. In other words, FY 2025 cannot be
regarded as the terminal point for examining the sustainability of the
health insurance system.6
12.4.2 Long-Term Care Costs
The government anticipates that long-term care costs will grow more
rapidly as compared to health care costs. According to the MHLW 2004
projection given in table 12.4, the long-term care insurance beneﬁts in FY
2025 (the ratio of long-term care beneﬁts to NI) will be 2.7 times greater
than its value in FY 2004. The growth rate of per capita long-term care
costs is set to be higher than the wage growth rate although detailed as-
sumptions have not bee explicitly documented.
Municipal governments prepare three-year business plans for long-term
care insurance. Prior to the ﬁrst revision that was made in FY 2003, The
Projection of Demand for Long-term Care (Kaigo Sahbisuryou tou no Mi-
tooshi,June 2002) was provided by the MHLW; it expected an increased de-
mand for long-term care in the following ﬁve years. For example, the pro-
visional nationwide sum of the usage of home-visit services will increase by
39.3 percent from FY 2003 (142,194 visits) to FY 2007 (198,033 visits).7
The projection however, did not provide the total amount of long-term
care costs. We calculated the sum of these provisions weighted by their ac-
tual costs in FY 2003 and the resulting growth during FY 2003 to 2007 that
amounted to 26.4 percent.
We projected the future long-term care insurance beneﬁts by adopting a
methodology similar to that used for the projections of health insurance.8
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6. We should note that our projections may be biased in an upward direction because they
do not take into account the eﬀects of aging on terminal care expenses. In Japan, Ohkusa
(2002) and Suzuki and Suzuki (2003) provided a modiﬁed projection that took into account
this aspect. Since terminal care expenses for the more aged tend to decrease, a longer lon-
gevity will increase the average age of death; hence, future health expenditure by age group 
is expected to be lower than its present level. Taking this eﬀect into consideration, the previ-
ously mentioned studies pointed out that the MHLW 2004 projection overestimated the fu-
ture health expenditure. Suzuki and Suzuki (2003) reported this overestimation amounted to
approximately 4.4 percent of the total health expenditures for the elderly. On the other hand,
Ohkusa (2002) concluded that the overestimation reached a level of approximately 15 to 30
percent of the total health expenditures. The divergence in their estimates is quite large be-
cause data limitations made it diﬃcult to separate the medical expenditures of the survivors
from the medical expenses incurred by those who died.
7. This projection presumed that the number of individuals certiﬁed as requiring care in FY
2003 was 3,279,000; however, the actual number of these certiﬁed individuals was 2,983,000
at the end of FY 2003.
8. Mitchell, Pigott, and Shimizutani (2004), Shimizutani and Noguchi (2004), and Suzuki
(2002) are involved in projecting the future long-term care costs.At the time of writing this chapter, the most recent data for annual spend-
ing by age group were available for FY 2002; hence, we estimated annual
spending on the basis of monthly data. The long-term care expenditure by
age group in October 2004 was calculated from the Monthly Report of Long-
Term Care Beneﬁts Survey (Kaigo Kyufuhi Jittai Chosa Geppo) conducted 
by the MHLW.9 We then calculated annual spending by multiplying the
monthly data with 12 and reported it in the right column of table 12.5. The
future long-term care expenditure was then projected under the following
three settings. The ﬁrst one (optimistic) assumed that the age-expenditure
proﬁle would not change and that only the population structure would
change. We then decomposed the total spending into social security bene-
ﬁts and out-of-pocket expenses by assuming that the ratio of out-of-pocket
payments to total costs in FY 2002 (8.99 percent10) would be sustained.
We then analyzed the following three scenarios of long-term care costs:
(a) the per capita cost of each age group will grow at the wage growth rate
(optimistic); (b) until 2025, the rate of growth in per capita cost will exceed
the wage growth rate by 1.2 percentage points and, as a result, the total cost
per income well approximated the MHLW 2004 projection (pessimistic);
and (c) until 2100, the per capita cost will grow at a rate that exceeds the
wage growth rate by 1.2 percentage points (very pessimistic). The proper-
ties of these settings parallel those applied for health care costs. Combin-
ing these settings with three labor force projections yields nine scenarios.
The resulting ratios are presented in the lower section of table 12.6.
The rate of growth from FY 2004 to FY 2025 is projected to lie between
2.03 and 2.79. According to the governmental projection, it is estimated to
be 2.67, which is relatively pessimistic. If the per capita long-term care cost
grows at the existing wage growth rate, the rate of growth is estimated to
range between 2.03 and 2.17 depending on the labor force scenario.
12.5 Simulation of Health Care and Long-Term Care Insurance Policies
12.5.1 Procedures of the Simulation
This section deals with the simulation of policies that ﬁnance future
health and long-term care insurance beneﬁts, the projections of which were
described in the previous section. This section focuses on the eﬀect of these
policies on ﬁscal balances and burdens across generations.
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9. The data source does not directly report cost by age group. The available cross tables in-
dicate (a) the cost by the severity of disability and (b) the total number of beneﬁciaries by the
severity of disability and age group. Assuming that the long-term care cost of each level of dis-
ability was the same across all age groups that were considered, we estimated the total cost by
age group by using these two cross tables.
10. It is slightly lower than the statutory coinsurance rate (10 percent) because there are
some measures that lighten the burden of out-of-pocket payments.Since we regard the beneﬁts derived from these insurances as necessary
services when a person becomes sick or disabled, it is not very meaningful
to discuss the intergenerational distribution of these beneﬁts. Hence, our
simulation focuses only on the ﬁnancing of these beneﬁts.
From October 2007, half of the beneﬁts derived from the health insur-
ance of those aged 75 and above will be ﬁnanced with government subsi-
dies that are in turn ﬁnanced by general tax revenues. Until October 2002,
only 30 percent of these beneﬁts for those aged 70 and above were ﬁnanced
with government subsidies. From 2002 to 2007, a transition process grad-
ually raised the eligible age and the share of government subsidies. Half of
the long-term care insurance beneﬁt is ﬁnanced with government subsi-
dies. The other major subsidies granted by the government are 50 percent
of the beneﬁts of National Health Insurance schemes (Kokuho) and 13
percent of the Government-Managed Health Insurance for Employees
(Seikan Kenpo).
We assume that social insurance premiums and taxes for social insur-
ance beneﬁts are paid from the same income base, which is the compensa-
tion of employees and the mixed income in terms of national accounts. For
simplicity, we further assume that these incomes will grow at the same rate
as GDP (and labor input) after FY 2004 and that there are no administra-
tive costs involved in the implementation of such social insurance pro-
grams.11
The initial and terminal years of the simulation process are set as FY
2004 and FY 2100, respectively, because the population projection carried
out by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research
is available only within these periods.
We consider the following two policies:
Policy A: A balanced budget operation in which the beneﬁts during each
year are ﬁnanced by the taxes and insurance premiums of the correspon-
ding year
Policy B: An attempt to reduce the intergenerational inequity of burdens
by prefunding future social insurance payments for the elderly (details will
be described in section 12.5.3).
12.5.2 Balanced Budget
We deﬁne burden rate as the ratio of burdens (the sum of insurance pre-
miums and government subsidies ﬁnanced by taxes) to 90 percent of the
sum of compensation of employees and the mixed income. We aimed to
calibrate the statutory premium rate by rescaling the sum of the compen-
sation received by the employees and the mixed income. The health insur-
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11. For instance, the administrative cost involved with the implementation of Society-
Managed Health Insurance for Employees is about 0.4 percent of the total beneﬁts derived
from such programs during FY 2001.ance premium (including government subsidies for the nonelderly and ex-
cluding those reserved for the elderly) for the initial year (i.e., FY 2004) is
calculated to be 8.21 percent. The actual health insurance premium for the
enrollees of the Government-Managed Health Insurance for Employees 
is calculated to be 8.2 percent. Since the enrollees of the Government-
Managed Health Insurance for Employees are employed with small com-
panies, their average salary is lower than that of all the workers. Since gov-
ernment subsidies aim to oﬀset the earnings diﬀerence, we tried to calibrate
the statutory insurance premium. With regard to long-term care insur-
ance, the simulated premium rate for FY 2004 is 1.11 percent; this matches
the actual insurance premium paid by the enrollees of the Government-
Managed Health Insurance for Employees. Under the balanced budget,
the burden is equal to social insurance beneﬁts (excluding out-of-pocket
payment). Therefore, we calculated the ratio of beneﬁts to incomes.
Figure 12.2 presents the burden rates associated with health care, long-
term care, and a total of both of them when Policy A is implemented un-
der the governmental projection (social cost–pessimistic and labor force–
pessimistic). The burden rate for health care continues to increase until FY
2059 when it touches 19.94 percent. As against this, the burden rate for a
long-term care will touch 10.97 percent in FY 2066. Although the paths
followed by these two burden rates appear to be parallel to each other in
ﬁgure 12.2, we must however, note that the absolute level of long-term care
costs is low. The burden rate for long-term care grows much more rapidly
than that for health care because compared to health care beneﬁts, long-
term care beneﬁts are concentrated to a greater extent on the aged popula-
tion. For the same reason, a peak representing the burden rate for long-
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Fig. 12.2 The burden rates under policy A (balanced budget)term care will follow a peak of the burden rate for health care. The total
burden rate of both the insurances reaches a peak that is 30.65 percent in
FY 2064. The ratio of total burden to GDP then amounts to 15.63 percent
in the same year.
Figure 12.3 presents the lifetime burden rate of each generation under
the governmental projection. It is deﬁned as the ratio of lifetime burden to
lifetime income. The lifetime variable is the sum of the present discounted
values of the reported annual numbers during the period between the ini-
tial and the terminal points of the simulation process. Therefore, the bur-
den rate is the prospective lifetime burden for the generation born in 2001
or earlier. To estimate lifetime income, we adopted the age-wage proﬁle,
which was used to calculate the labor input in section 12.3. The interest rate
is assumed to be 1 percentage point higher than the wage growth rate.
The horizontal axis of ﬁgure 12.3 represents the birth year of each gen-
eration. The curve representing the lifetime burden rates are not smooth
for early generations, possibly because our prospective calculation covers
only a short period for these generations. Figure 12.3 indicates that a bal-
anced budget system will impose heavier burdens on the younger genera-
tions. The inequality of burdens is particularly severe for the current work-
ing-age generation. The lifetime burden rate for those who were born in
2001 is estimated to be 26.2 percent while the same for those born in 1945
is 14.8 percent.
12.5.3 Equalizing the Burden by Prefunding Policies
The increasing burden on future generations, as depicted in ﬁgure 12.3,
may be circumvented by implementing a policy that levies a constant bur-
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Fig. 12.3 Lifetime burden rates by generation under policy A (balanced budget)den rate over time. Such a policy aims at charging a high burden rate in ad-
vance so that suﬃcient funds can be accumulated in order to prepare for
increasing costs in the future. Feldstein (1999) advocated the idea of pre-
funding Medicare, which is the U.S. public health insurance for the elderly.
As an example of the prefunding of health and long-term care costs, we
consider the following policy. With regard to health insurance, a portion of
the prefunding would be channelized in order to ﬁnance the insurance pay-
ments dealing with health care costs with regard to the elderly (age 65 and
over). Workers who are aged 15 and above make payments in the form 
of premiums. The health care costs for those aged 64 and below and gov-
ernment subsidies in the form of beneﬁts to the elderly are ﬁnanced by a
pay-as-you-go system. Long-term care insurance employs a prefunding
scheme, while government subsidies are ﬁnanced by a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem. Since the enrollees of the current system are those who are aged 40
and above, we assume that workers falling into this age group pay these
premiums.
The setting of the interest rate is a key factor in determining the perfor-
mance of a prefunding scheme. When we focus on the proportion of bur-
dens to income, it is not the absolute levels but the diﬀerence between the
interest rate and the wage growth rate that matters. The MHLW projection
on public pension ﬁnance in May 2004 assumed that the nominal interest
rate would be 3.2 percent and that the growth rate of nominal wage would
be 2.1 percent. Our baseline case sets a 1 percentage point diﬀerence be-
tween the interest rate and the growth rate of wage. As an alternative sce-
nario, the diﬀerence is set either as 0 percent or 2 percent.12
Since the current health and long-term care insurance program is set
within a pay-as-you-go framework, a transition to a funded system should
be designed. With regard to health care costs, we ﬁrst calculate the contri-
bution rate that is suﬃcient for the entire cohort born in FY 2001 to ﬁnance
the expected value of their lifetime health insurance beneﬁts beyond the
age of 65 years. This rate is estimated to be 4.96 percent under the govern-
mental projection and the baseline scenario of the interest rate. If the co-
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12. Feldstein and Samwick’s (1997) simulation of the prefunding of the U.S. social security
program assumed that the real rate of return is 9 percent, which is considerably higher as
compared to ours. Their following researches (Feldstein and Samwick 1998) used 5.5 percent
as the rate of return, which is still higher as compared to ours. We employed lower interest
rates due to the following reasons. First, their rates of return are based on risky capital; how-
ever, we considered the risk-free rate of return. We think that the investment strategies per-
taining to funded health care and long-term care insurance should be conservative because
these insurances aim to ﬁnance a strictly targeted consumption item that cannot be easily sub-
stituted. Second, our simulation process does not incorporate the general equilibrium eﬀect,
in which an accumulated social insurance fund tends to lower the interest rate of a large open
economy. We therefore attempt to infer the consequences of this eﬀect by looking at a partic-
ular case in which the interest rate is maintained at a low level from the beginning. Third, given
the recent poor performance of Japanese asset prices, a high rate of return does not appear
plausible.horts born after FY 2001 pay the premium at this rate, the total accu-
mulated funds in FY 2100 would amount to 111.11 percent of the GDP.
Hence, the transition process is designed in such a manner that it accumu-
lates this level of funds with a constant premium rate until FY 2100. Since
the current generations did not prefund their health care costs, 4.96 per-
cent of the premium rate is not suﬃcient to meet the target in FY 2100. It
is therefore concluded that a contribution rate of 8.52 percent will success-
fully accumulate the required funds.
The evolution of the funded system will be achieved in the following
manner (table 12.7summarizes the numbers that represent the burdens un-
der Policies A and B). When health care costs (excluding government sub-
sidies) are ﬁnanced by a pay-as-you-go scheme in FY 2004, the contribu-
tion rate with regard to the same for individuals aged 64 and below is 4.32
percent and for those aged 65 and above is 3.89 percent. When a transition
toward a prefunding scheme begins in FY 2005, the contribution rate for
the elderly increases to 8.52 percent under the governmental projection
and maintains this value until FY 2100. Beyond FY 2100, the contribution
rate for the elderly will shrink to 4.96 percent. As against this, the contri-
bution rate for the health care costs of the aged below 64 is almost stable.
It ranges between 3.97 percent and 4.3 percent.
The transition process of the long-term care insurance program is de-
signed along lines parallel to the health insurance program. The contribu-
tion rate that is suﬃcient for the cohort born in FY 2001 to ﬁnance the ex-
pected value of their lifetime long-term care insurance beneﬁts is 2.17
percent under the governmental projection. If the cohorts born after FY
2001 pay the premium at this rate, the total accumulated funds in FY 2100
would amount to 68.35 percent of the GDP. This amount of funds will be
accumulated by a contribution rate of 3.95 percent during the transition
process. When long-term care costs (excluding government subsidies) are
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Table 12.7 Contribution rates under the balanced budget and prefunding schemes
(A) (B)
Balanced budget Prefunding
2004 2005–2100 2005–2100 2101–
Total 12.01 12.28–28.12 19.62–26.70
Health insurance
Nonelderly 4.32 3.97–4.30
Elderly 3.89 3.98–9.08 8.52 4.96
Government subsidies 2.69 2.84–10.07
Long-term care insurance 1.11 1.16–4.83 3.95 2.17
Notes: Numbers represent the percentage of earnings (90 percent of compensation of
employees and mixed income). The interest rate is based on the baseline case, and other pa-
rameters are based on the governmental projection.ﬁnanced by a pay-as-you-go scheme in FY 2004, the contribution rate is es-
timated to be 1.11 percent. When a transition toward a prefunding scheme
begins in FY 2005, the contribution rate increases to 3.95 percent, and
maintains this value until FY 2100. Beyond FY 2100, the contribution rate
will shrink to 2.17 percent.
For the calibrated value in FY 2004, the health insurance payments for
the nonelderly is estimated to be 4.32 percent of the total earnings and
those for the elderly is estimated to be 3.89 percent of the total earnings,
with the long-term care costs being estimated as 1.11 percent. When social
insurance premiums and government subsidies are combined, the overall
burden rate becomes 12.01 percent. Under the pay-as-you-go system, the
social costs for the elderly will grow steadily. The total burden ratio will go
up to 28.12 percent of the total earnings. The burden rate of health insur-
ance payments will go up to 9.08 percent. The growth of government sub-
sidies however, is more rapid, the highest level attained by it being 10.07
percent.
Under the prefunding scheme, it is estimated that the burden rate will in-
crease from 12.01 percent in FY 2004 to 19.62 percent in FY 2005. The rate
of change in total burdens at the initial point is 63 percent. Since govern-
ment subsidies are bound to grow, as in the case of the pay-as-you-go sys-
tem, the highest level attained by the total burden rate will be 26.70 percent
in FY 2064.
Figure 12.4 compares the lifetime burden rates between the balanced
budget and the prefunding schemes. We should note that the burden rates
for those born after 2001 do not cover their whole lifetime because the sim-
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Fig. 12.4 Lifetime burden rates under policy A (balanced budget) and policy B
(prefunding)ulation terminates in FY 2100. When the system is changed from a bal-
anced budget to a prefunding one, generations who are born prior to 1997
will face a higher lifetime burden, and younger generations will beneﬁt
from a lower lifetime burden. The curve representing lifetime burden in ﬁg-
ure 12.4 becomes ﬂatter. Hence, a prefunding scheme helps to reduce the
inequality of burdens. This will be made possible only if the current gener-
ation agrees to share burdens with future generations.
Suzuki (2000) conducted a similar study dealing with the calculation of
the transition to a fully funded health insurance system. While our cal-
culation unites the whole sector of health insurance, his calculation was
based on the decomposition of the same into subsidiary systems of insur-
ance. The transition was assumed to begin in FY 1995 and attain the state
of a fully funded scheme by FY 2100. With regard to the Society-Managed
Health Insurance for Employees (Kumiai Kenpo), the contribution rate is
estimated to increase from 7.8 percent to 9.8 percent.
According to Suzuki’s speciﬁcation, a fully funded scheme ﬁnances an
individual’s lifetime health care costs. Before individuals begin to work,
their prefunding account has to borrow money. This account needs to bor-
row money during the early stages of an individual’s life. The resulting
number of aggregate funds would still be lower than the number involved
in our scheme. This is primarily the reason why we reported a much larger
hike in the contribution rate during the transition process as compared to
that reported in Suzuki (2000).
12.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 12.8 represents the contribution rates of the prefunding scheme in
FY 2005 to 2100 and beyond FY 2100 under 27 diverse scenarios. The as-
sumption of a labor force participation does not aﬀect the contribution
rate to a large extent. The diﬀerence in the health insurance contribution
rate between a pessimistic scenario and the most optimistic scenario is 0.36
to 0.92 percentage points. The gap between the two is large, when the pro-
jection of social costs is pessimistic. This reﬂects the fact that a funding
scheme is not inﬂuenced by a demographic change. On the other hand, the
interest rate aﬀects the contribution rate. Under the optimistic scenario (in
which the interest rate is 2 percentage points higher than the wage growth
rate), the contribution rate is 1.5 to 4.68 percentage points lower than that
under the pessimistic scenario. The setting of social costs has an even larger
impact on the contribution rate, as compared to the impact of interest rate
on the same. The diﬀerence in the contribution rates during a transition pe-
riod between a pessimistic scenario and an optimistic scenario is 3.13 to
6.33 percentage points.
The previous ﬁndings can also be applied to the case of long-term care
insurance. The eﬀect of interest rate is relatively large as compared to the
size of the beneﬁts. The diﬀerence in the contribution rate between the op-
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insurance scheme (%)
Health care 
for the elderly Long-term care
2005–2100 2101– 2005–2100 2101–
Interest rate = Growth rate = 2%
Social cost: Optimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 6.25 2.74 2.66 1.08
Optimistic 6.36 2.81 2.71 1.10
Pessimistic 6.61 2.90 2.82 1.14
Social cost: Pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 7.56 3.45 3.31 1.38
Optimistic 7.69 3.53 3.37 1.41
Pessimistic 7.99 3.64 3.51 1.46
Social cost: Very pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 9.38 6.06 4.47 2.81
Optimistic 9.55 6.20 4.55 2.88
Pessimistic 9.92 6.40 4.73 2.97
Interest rate = Growth rate = 1%
Social cost: Optimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 6.84 3.85 3.08 1.65
Optimistic 6.97 3.94 3.14 1.69
Pessimistic 7.26 4.08 3.27 1.75
Social cost: Pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 8.36 4.84 3.88 2.12
Optimistic 8.52 4.96 3.95 2.17
Pessimistic 8.88 5.14 4.12 2.25
Social cost: Very pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 11.09 8.58 5.69 4.35
Optimistic 11.30 8.78 5.80 4.46
Pessimistic 11.78 9.10 6.04 4.62
Interest rate = Growth rate
Social cost: Optimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 7.75 5.36 3.74 2.51
Optimistic 7.91 5.48 3.81 2.57
Pessimistic 8.27 5.72 3.99 2.68
Social cost: Pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 9.58 6.75 4.74 3.23
Optimistic 9.77 6.90 4.84 3.31
Pessimistic 10.22 7.19 5.06 3.44
Social cost: Very pessimistic
Labor force
Very optimistic 13.68 12.05 7.62 6.71
Optimistic 13.96 12.33 7.78 6.86
Pessimistic 14.60 12.84 8.14 7.15
Notes: Numbers represent the percentage of earnings (90 percent of compensation of em-
ployees and mixed income). In FY2004, the contribution rate of health insurance for the el-
derly is 3.89 percent and that for long-term care insurance is 1.11 percent.timistic and the pessimistic scenario ranges between 1.08 to 3.41 percent-
age points.
Even under the most optimistic scenario, the burden rate associated with
health care and long-term care costs increases at a rate of 16.05 percentage
points from the starting point. The rate of change in the total value of the
burden rate is 34 percent, which is smaller than the governmental projec-
tion, but is still quite signiﬁcant. Under the most pessimistic scenario, the
rate of change is 85 percent. Although quantitative implications depend on
the individual settings associated with each of the programs, a signiﬁcant
increase in the contribution rate is needed to implement a prefunding
scheme.
Figure 12.5 maps the total number of burden rates that are associated
with the baseline scenario and six alternative scenarios that in turn take an
alternative scenario with one variable among the three available. Since the
baseline scenario takes into account an intermediate assumption regard-
ing the three variables, it takes the centermost line of all the seven lines. The
line at the highest level represents the case of the most pessimistic social
cost scenario. Since the growth of social costs is assumed to continue till
the end of this century, the burden rate for future generations is far larger
in this scenario as compared to that in other scenarios. The lowest line rep-
resents the case of the most optimistic social cost scenario. Social costs
have the most signiﬁcant impact on the burden rate. The impact of labor
force on the burden rate is the least among the three variables considered
so far. Higher interest rates can reduce the burden rates considerably. For
the generation born in 2001, the lifetime burden rate is estimated to be
Policy Options for Financing Future Health and Long-Term Care Costs 439
Fig. 12.5 Total burden rates under alternative scenarios25.62 percent under the baseline scenario and 20.15 percent under the sce-
nario with an interest rate higher by 1 percentage point.
12.6 Conclusion
As the Japanese population structure changes, the current approach of
ﬁnancing (pay-as-you-go) the social costs will create a large increase in the
magnitude of future burdens. It will also create an intergenerational in-
equity of burdens. We analyzed an alternative policy that prefunds the ben-
eﬁts for the elderly aged 65 and above. Prefunding is not very popular in
Japan. Our analysis aims at providing real-life scenarios with regard to this
policy option and to stimulate policy discussions.
During the transition process until FY 2100, the scheme maintains a
higher contribution rate in order to accumulate suﬃcient funds. With re-
spect to the parameters implied by the governmental projection, the sum
of the contribution rates with regard to health insurance and long-term
care insurance increases from 5.00 percent of the total earnings to 12.47
percent of the same. The rate of increase in total burdens including taxes
for subsidies is 63 percent.
Our sensitivity analysis has indicated that quantitative implications de-
pend on the settings of the social costs, the labor force, and the interest rate.
However, labor force scenarios do not have a considerable impact on the
rate of burden. As against this, the setting of social costs has a signiﬁcant
impact. Although we cannot predict the exact amount of the necessary
contribution rate that would be suﬃcient to transfer the funded system, it
is certain that a signiﬁcant increase in the contribution rate is inevitable.
Even under the most optimistic scenario of the 27 possible scenarios, a nec-
essary increase in the contribution rates of the two social insurances is 3.91
percentage points. The rate of increase in the total amount of burdens is 34
percent.
Implementing a prefunding social cost program may be a challenge be-
cause the initial increase in burdens is politically unfavorable. However, the
cost of not introducing this scheme implies a heavier burden on future gen-
erations. Raising the contribution rate in an aggressive manner will help to
reduce the intergenerational imbalance of burdens.
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Comment Epictetus Patalinghug
Introduction
This chapter estimates the quantitative magnitude of implementing a
prefunding scheme to ﬁnance Japan’s future health and long-term care
costs. It starts by arguing that Japan’s social security beneﬁts will grow at a
double-digit rate, and a growing component of these beneﬁts is the beneﬁt
due to health insurance and long-term care insurance. The authors argue
that the burden of workers will steadily increase and it will create intergen-
erational imbalance of burdens if the health and long-term care insurances
are continued to be ﬁnanced under the current pay-as-you-go system. In
estimating the general magnitude of the prefunding burden, the authors
provided an alternative projection of the labor force (assuming less opti-
mistic labor-participation rates), projected health and long-term care ben-
eﬁts, and conducted sensitivity analysis of contribution rates under a pre-
funding scheme. The chapter concluded that the prefunding scheme will
signiﬁcantly increase the appropriate contribution rate, but it will likewise
reduce the intergenerational inequity of burdens. The analysis of the chap-
ter is consistent with the ﬁndings of Takayama and Kitamura (1999),
which looked at the impact on generational imbalance of ﬁscal policy. In
this study, the authors also suggested the use of the prefunding scheme as
a way of restoring equity in the social insurance program in Japan. The
chapter is very timely because Japanese policymakers are currently con-
templating on economic policy reforms to ensure the sustainability of its
ﬁscal and social security programs.
Analysis and Findings
The eﬀorts of the authors are to be lauded. However, the authors need to
address some gaps in their work. Economists argue that political feasibil-
ity is a crucial element in the formulation of policy. The authors do not ad-
dress the issue of how a change to a prefunding scheme that would alter the
redistributive burdens can be more palatable to those adversely aﬀected.
The chapter does not explicitly take into account the response of individu-
als and ﬁrms to changes in the health and long-term care insurance system.
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